TALKING JUDGES
Jack Knight
Mitu Gulati
The Evaluating Judges conference held in October 2009 was the second in a
series of conferences planned at Duke Law School in which judges and academics came
together to discuss questions relating to research on judges.1 As two academics who study
judges, we find these opportunities to interact with judges valuable. On occasion, the
interactions can be tense—such as when the judges tell us why they think our work is
fundamentally flawed, and we try to respond by pointing to data that seem to contradict
their arguments, and they assert that the data are biased and so on. This recent conference
was not lacking in tension, but it was different in that it did not follow the typical format
of involving judges or other practitioners in academic work. Under that format,
academics present research papers, and then judges or other practitioners provide
commentary. At this conference, by contrast, the judges took the lead role, identifying
and discussing the topics they thought were most relevant to research on evaluating
judicial behavior. To be sure, part of the conference still involved the judges telling the
academics, and particularly the empiricists, that they were headed in the wrong directions
and that judging was an “art” and not amenable to measurement.2 But the judges also
talked about what they thought was important and what kind of information they might
consider important in evaluating themselves or their fellow judges. It is the latter set of
conversations that we focus on here.
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To which we might ask, “Aren’t there market prices for art?”
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The observations we report on are from two days of conversations between judges
and academics, both at the formal sessions and informally during breaks and at meals.
We combine those with similar observations from the one-day conference on Measuring
Judges held a year ago at Duke. (The earlier conference followed the more typical format,
with empiricists presenting research and judges commenting.) What we report here are no
more than subjective impressions. For reasons of confidentiality, we provide no
identifying information on the sources of our observations. Instead, we paint some
general themes with a broad brush. Our reason for reporting on these themes is that there
are ideas here about studying judges that would not have occurred to us but for the
opportunity to talk to judges themselves. Hopefully, other researchers will find these
ideas as interesting as we did.

I. WHAT JUDGES DISLIKE
It was clear that the judges dislike being measured and ranked by academics who
do not understand anything about what qualities make for a truly great judge. The first
couple of sessions of the conference, therefore, featured a number of the judges talking
about how the measures used by academics to evaluate them were bogus. For example,
many of the judges found using citation counts to measure the quality of judicial
decisions particularly problematic. According to some, citation counts are flawed because
they measure judicial expansiveness, rather than careful and narrow fact-driven analysis.
Also annoying, according to some of the judges, are attempts to measure independence
using the degree of disagreement among judges. Judicial independence is often measured
by how often judges dissent, particularly against those from the same party. This is not

judicial independence, as these judges saw it: rather, dissenting is more akin to
cantankerousness—at best, it is indulgent; at worst, it undermines collegiality.3
Fair enough. The point, at first cut, appeared to be that academics like us were
drawing the wrong inferences from the data. Instead of concluding that the judges with
the most citations were the most influential (and thus the “best”), we should have been
saying that they were likely the most expansive (and thus the “worst”). And instead of
using the term “independence” for the measure of dissents, perhaps we should have been
using the terms “disagreeable” or “uncollegial.”
Indeed, these are questions that can probably be tested against other measures.
One could look at the opinions cited more frequently and examine whether they are more
expansive than the ones cited less (assuming one could come up with a measure for
expansiveness4). If it turned out that this were the case, we asked the judges, would they
be willing to look at citation rates as a measure of bad judicial performance? Their
response was that we were still missing the point. The point was not that citation rates
showed low-quality judging rather than high-quality judging, but that they showed
nothing. It would be as if we had taken data on sunspots and used that to evaluate judges.
The bottom line for some of the judges (not all) seemed to be that no data is better than
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We probably should have asked the judges to define more precisely what they meant by
expansiveness; our guess is that it is the converse of deciding a case narrowly. And
narrow decision making, where the judge addresses as few issues as possible, appears to
be viewed by many as a virtue. The theoretical basis for the assertion that narrow
decisionmaking is necessarily optimal is not, however, clear to us.

the type of data that many academics were using.5 Further, they seemed deeply skeptical
of the ability academics to ever come up with objective measures of judicial performance,
given the complexity of the job.6 From their perspective, such reductionist research is
demeaning to the judges and undermines the system as a whole.
Lastly, there was concern expressed that some judges might focus unduly on
trying to do well in the academics’ rankings. That is, they might focus their efforts on
publishing opinions, dissenting against co-partisans, and obtaining citations instead of on
the important aspects of the job—which, at the district level, is mostly about case
management. We have to confess that the idea that judges would pay even the slightest
bit of attention to a ranking by some academics, let alone that it might affect their
behavior, was more than a bit surprising. After all, a number of the judges also seemed to
be of the view that academics these days produce little scholarship of value to the
judiciary.
That said, assuming some judges did care about these rankings, it is not clear that
this is a bad thing. To do well on the rankings, judges would have to act in a less partisan
fashion (by being willing to disagree with co-partisans), write more publishable-quality
opinions, and write opinions that others would wish to use to construct their own
arguments (to garner more citations). If judges did modify their behavior at the margins
to do better in these areas, would that be a bad thing? The point that these may not be
characteristics that are valuable at the trial level is valid. But the response to that is
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simply that the ranking of district judges should focus more on case-management
techniques.
There is a bigger point here, though, which is that if judges really do pay attention
to academic attempts to rank them, these rankings can be a means to incentivize judges.
And incentivizing judges, particularly those with life appointments, has always been a
difficult problem. Better rankings will presumably produce better incentives. If so, the
goal should be to produce better rankings. At the end of the day, though, we are not
persuaded that judges pay much attention to academic rankings. (There are numbers to
which they do pay attention: reversal rates. But more on that later.)
Despite their hostility toward academic attempts to measure judge and court
performance, the judges were willing to talk about what constituted good judging.
Although this was by no means a uniform sentiment, judges appear to value politeness.
What is important is showing the appropriate amounts of respect for lawyers, fellow
judges, and judges at lower levels of the hierarchy. Assuming that politeness is important,
one question is how to measure it. During a coffee break, one judge suggested that
empiricists might look at the frequency of the use of certain words—he suggested
“frivolous,” among others—that indicated disrespect of the lower courts or the lawyers
involved in the case.
The bigger question, though, was whether having strong norms of politeness
actually benefited the system of justice.7 One answer was that strong norms of politeness
promote deliberation and discussion. The term that kept coming up in connection with
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these ideas was “collegiality.”8 But do we know whether politeness, particularly of the
superficial variety, promotes deliberation and discussion? If judges have to constrain their
comments to satisfy the norms of politeness, does that not hurt deliberation? Given the
evidence on how easily homogeneous groups can descend into groupthink, is it not
important to ensure that there are disruptive elements?9 We do not have answers to these
questions, but they struck us as ones worth pursuing.
As the discussion of the value of deliberation progressed, an issue that we found
interesting was the degree to which deliberation among judges, particularly at the
appellate level, takes place via highly formalized routines. In some courts, for example,
the norm is that judges who are collaborating on an opinion for a case do not simply call
each other up and chat about issues with which they might be struggling. Instead,
communication is often highly structured and limited to written correspondence. The
primary writer of the draft will produce a document and then circulate a copy. The other
judges on the panel are not allowed, by norm, to edit that document—not even with
track-changes or comment functions. Instead, they respond via memoranda that typically
follow a fixed format.
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In other courts, there are formal rules about who gets to speak and when they get
to speak during judicial conferences (the meetings at which judges discuss the case after
hearing it). Often, the rule is that the judges speak in order of seniority, and when they
speak they also announce their vote. Furthermore, there may be implicit rules about what
kinds of things judges are allowed to say and whether it is acceptable to have debate. For
example, is it okay to ask the other judge what his reasons for coming to his decision are?
Is it okay to challenge those decisions at the conference? (As best we can tell, the answer
is no to both of these questions.)
The foregoing raised the question of whether the formal rules that structure
judicial conversation and communication (assuming that they are widespread) help or
harm deliberation on collegial courts. A couple of the female participants pointed out that
it was possible that this formality would stifle active deliberation and unduly constrain
outsiders to the system (such as women and racial minorities). There is, after all, a
growing literature about the need to diversify the judiciary so as to get a broader range of
perspectives. But, given that there are relatively small numbers of racial minorities and
women on the courts (more of the latter than the former), the only way to have their
perspectives heard, we suspect, is to have more deliberation. In other words, at least with
respect to diversity, we should want more disagreement and less collegiality.10
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Along these lines, scholars have examined whether increased levels of gender diversity
correlate with higher levels of dissent and slower decisionmaking. Even assuming that
that is the case, neither finding should be necessarily dismaying, because one of the
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One of the most important features of the justification for deliberation as a way of
enhancing collective decisionmaking is the purported benefit of having a wide range of
opinions in the decisionmaking process. According to this argument, we need an
institutional setting that maximizes the opportunities for these diverse perspectives to
participate in the process to realize these beneficial effects. Our discussion raised a basic
question: will the purported beneficial effects of diverse perspectives emerge within these
conversations’ highly constrained structures?
Now, it was not clear to us that the judges themselves were attached to or
particularly fond of these constraints on conversation. One cynical judge with whom we
discussed this question at a subsequent conference asked whether it really made much of
a difference, for example, to say “I respectfully dissent” instead of “I dissent” when the
substance of the dissent was to say “Your opinion is completely and utterly wrong.” Plus,
if everyone understands that “I respectfully dissent” does not signal any respect, who
cares?
Finally, neither judges nor academics appeared to have any sense of how much
variation there was across courts in these rules of communication, let alone whether they
had a meaningful impact on the quality of deliberation (and ultimately, the quality of
dispute resolution).

II. REVERSAL RATES
The most interesting parts of the workshop for us were the final two sessions,
during which the judges raised the issue of using reversal rates to evaluate judges. The

although diversity among circuit courts leads to losses in judicial efficiency, those losses
can be mitigated if circuit courts reach a certain level of diversity).

one statistic that a number of the judges appeared to be aware of was their number of
reversals. (Further, at least some of the judges had detailed explanations for why the
reversals had been unfair or unwarranted.) The academic empirical literature, by contrast,
has not done a great deal with reversal rates.11 Part of the reason for this, we suspect, is
the dominance of the political-science perspective in this area of research. From that
perspective, reversals are likely to be a function of political differences between the
appeals courts and the lower courts. So, one would expect to see Republican appeals
court judges reversing Democrat trial judges more often than they would reverse
Republican trial judges. In other words, reversal rates
The fact that judges care about reversals suggests that academics might wish to
pay more attention to them. If judges dislike reversals, that suggests that they will take
actions in their decisionmaking to avoid reversals. Further, to the extent some judges
dislike reversals more than others, those different levels of reversal-aversion should
translate into different types of decisionmaking. A couple of the judges suggested that
this reversal-aversion might manifest itself in decisions at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Grants of motions to dismiss are subject to appellate review, the judges explained, but
denials are not. That creates an incentive for reversal-averse judges to be, at the margins,
more circumspect about granting dismissals.
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Another question that the discussion of reversals raised was what kinds of
measures of reversals would be meaningful in assessing the quality of judicial
decisionmaking. Should reversals by same-party appeals courts (Republican appeals
panel reversing a Republican trial judge) be a clearer sign of error than reversals by
opposite-party panels (Democrat panel reversing Republican trial judges)? The judges did
not find our attempt to bring politics back into the discussion of reversal rates appealing,
but we suspect that there is something there. One participant also raised the question of
whether judges who have more citations (the ones who write expansively) are more likely
to reverse lower court judges than those who have fewer citations. We don’t know the
answer to this question, but it makes sense that reversal rates would be correlated with
high citations. If one believes that high citations are a sign of quality—a view with which
the judges at the two conferences would disagree—then one would expect more reversals
by appeals court judges with more citations. After all, they would be more likely to find
errors in the lower court’s analyses. Conversely, oft-cited lower court judges should get
reversed less.
The discussion of reversal rates and the suggestion (implicit, we think) that
academics move away from citations and dissents to reversal rates also led to the question
of communication between trial and appeals court judges. Most academics knew little
about how much communication occurred between the appeals court judges and the
judges they were reversing. For example, was it customary for the appeals judges to call
up the trial judges and explain the reason for reversal? Did the appeals judges
periodically hold seminars to explain to the trial judges what kinds of errors the trial

judges were making systematically? Once the topic of reversals came up, there was
unending stream of questions and not enough time for answers.
Suffice it to say, however, that we have embarked on collecting reversal rates.

III. SHOWING UP
We finish with our observations on the contrasting behaviors of academics and
judges in that most mundane of matters: showing up. Getting the judges to agree to attend
was not easy. But once they had agreed to participate, they committed to the enterprise
from beginning to end: the judges, at both this and the prior conference, sat patiently
through almost all of the sessions. Many of our academic guests, by contrast, viewed
attendance as optional. Once they had presented their papers or spoken their piece, the
academics (probably including two of us) were more likely to tune out, go for a walk,
check email and text messages, and so on. As best we could tell, the judges also were
more likely than the academics to have looked at the background materials for the
conferences and done the reading.
Relatedly, the judges seemed cognizant of the hierarchy within their group. And
this hierarchy was a function of what level of court they sat on, rather than how
knowledgeable or capable they were. Although the ground rules of the conference
provided that participants were all at an equal level and were to refer to each other by
first name, it would not have taken an external observer long to determine which judges
were at which levels in the hierarchy. This is not to say that those at lower levels
necessarily deferred to the views of those at higher levels, but there was a pecking order.
Needless to say, academics have their own pecking order—few groups are more

conscious of social status than law professors. If asked, the judges could probably have
discerned a hierarchy among the academics as well. Our point simply is that the judges,
at both our conferences, were very aware of relative positions within the formal
hierarchy. That is, for example in the federal system, magistrate judges are below district
court judges, who are below appeals court judges, and so on.
Finally, judges are polite and proper in their interactions (at least, relative to the
academics). The judges almost never interrupted the other participants. They raised their
hands when they wished to speak and waited to be called on. The problem, though, was
that the initial roundtable format of the conversation allowed participants to interject
whenever they felt like talking, with the result that the academics tended to talk much
more. After a couple of the initial sessions, during which the judges could barely get a
word in, the format had to be changed so that a moderator would keep a queue of people
who wanted to speak and make sure that a handful of academics didn’t grab all the air
time.
These observations will strike some as trivial, but we find the mundane and trivial
interesting. What we saw, albeit from the behavior of two small groups, made us wonder
whether there was a story here worthy of further investigation. Are the people who
choose to become judges also the types of people who respect hierarchy and like
following rules, or do judges in the U.S. become socialized into certain patterns of rulefollowing behavior? Conversely, are people who choose to become academics perhaps
those who dislike the constraints of formal rules? To the extent we find that rulefollowing is more prevalent among judges, that raises additional questions: do outsiders
(women and racial minorities) who join the bench tend to violate the rules more or follow

them more? More broadly, if the people who become judges are more inclined to be rule
followers than those in the general population, does that say something about how laws
are likely to evolve in conservative directions?

CONCLUSION
Our observations from these conferences have implications for three different
areas of the study of law: explanations of judicial decisionmaking, assessments of the
quality of judicial decisionmaking, and analyses of legal and democratic deliberation.
In regard to issues of social-scientific explanations of judicial decisionmaking, the
discussions with judges suggest that there are two types of factors that may be worthy of
greater attention than they presently receive in the literature. The first encompasses
psychological factors such as temperament and concern with status. The aversion to
reversal on appeal, for example, could significantly restrain the decisions of judges. If
this aversion is as widespread as the discussions at these conferences suggested, then we
would want to figure out how to incorporate it in a generalizable way into the
explanations. The second encompasses group-dynamic factors such as the concern with
collegiality and the formal structure of deliberation. To the extent that such factors
influence the common processes of interaction among judges, our explanations of
collegial courts should take better note of them.
In regard to assessments of judicial quality, these discussions challenge us to
think harder about what constitutes a good measure of quality. The judges in our
conferences think that academics who study quality are misguided in their basic
conceptualization of good judging. And they offer in response some insights into the

image of the type of judge with whom they like to interact and the type of judge they
would most like to be. In essence, they are offering us a criterion of quality from an
internal perspective. Because we can reasonably assume that this self-image motivates, at
least in part, their behavior on the bench, it would be a mistake for us to ignore their
insights in our consideration of measurement questions. But the internal perspective alone
is not enough for an adequate account of judicial quality. Academics who study quality
bring a necessary external perspective to such an analysis. When effective, they can
develop measures that reflect a criterion of quality based on the effect of judicial
decisions on society writ large. Future assessments of judicial quality need to find a way
to incorporate both perspectives.
Finally, in regard to analyses of group deliberation, identifying the different rules
of deliberation and communication among judges and analyzing those rules’ effects on
decision quality are matters that both academics and judges should find interesting and
relevant. One of the things that struck us about the discussions at the conference was the
extent to which academics who study both legal and democratic deliberation may have
overestimated the amount of deliberation that actually takes place in the judicial process.
Juries and courts are two of the most common examples of group deliberation offered in
this literature. But the idealized characterization of deliberation found in the studies is far
different from the perspective that emerged from these conferences. Perhaps advocates of
deliberation should take a new look at judicial deliberation to see what they might learn
about what can and what cannot foster deliberation in group settings. And, at the same
time, judges who are persuaded of the benefits of serious deliberation on collegial courts

might take a moment to consider if their everyday practices actually foster or hinder such
deliberation.
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